First Burma campaign : the Japanese conquest of 1942 / by Colonel E.C.V. Foucar MC ; compiled and introduced by John Grehan.
Material type: TextPublisher: Barnsley, Yorkshire, England : Frontline Books, 2020Description: xvii, 366 pages, 8 unnumbered pages of plates : illustrations, map ; 24 cmContent type:- text
- still image
- unmediated
- volume
- 9781526783219
- 1526783215
- D767.6 .F68 2020
Item type | Current library | Collection | Call number | Status | Date due | Barcode | Item holds |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Non-Fiction | Davis (Central) Library Non-Fiction (NEST) | Non-Fiction (NEST) | 940.5425 FOU | Available | T00832433 |
Enhanced descriptions from Syndetics:
Shortly after the British and Indian forces had withdrawn from Burma in the face of the Japanese onslaught in 1942, Colonel E.C.V. Foucar MC was instructed to undertake a 'special duty', namely seek out documentary material and information from the various officers involved in the First Burma Campaign. The final element of Foucar's task was to write an account of the fighting, based on these many eyewitness accounts, for the Director of Military Training.This fascinating narrative sets out the challenging geographical, climatic and political conditions the British were faced with in Burma as war became an increasing possibility throughout 1940 and 1941, before turning its attention to the dramatic events when the Japanese launched their ground assault on the country in January 1942.There followed the 'Disaster' at Sittang Bridge, the fateful evacuation of Rangoon, and the march to the River Irrawaddy in an attempt to try and secure the north of Burma and its oil fields. But the loss of Rangoon meant the army was cut off from its supply base and the troops faced starving to death. With the Japanese closing in on the beleaguered British force, the decision was taken to abandon Burma and try to reach India. 'The odds were we might escape either the Japanese, the failure of our supplies, or the monsoon, but our chances of avoiding all three were slender,' declared General Alexander. His commander, General Wavell, wrote that, 'operations were now a race with the weather as with the Japanese and as much a fight against nature as against the enemy'.Along nothing more than rough country tracks up rugged hills and across rickety bridges constructed only of brushwood or bamboo the ragged, disease-ridden troops battled to reach India just as the monsoons broke. This, one of the most dramatic tales of the Second World War, was first described in detail by Colonel Foucar just after the events described and is now available for all to read.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of contents provided by Syndetics
- Introduction (p. x)
- Chapter 1 (p. 1)
- Burma
- Its physical features
- Resources and Industries
- Main towns
- Communications
- Lack of Communications with neighbouring countries.
- Chapter 2 (p. 10)
- Early history of Burma
- British associations with the country
- The wars with Burma
- British Rule
- Self Government and its results
- Japanese influences.
- Chapter 3 (p. 20)
- Events in the Far East
- Japanese aims and aggression
- Military forces in Burma
- Military effect of the Separation from India
- Creation of the Army in Burma
- Expansion from 1939 onwards
- State of preparedness of Burma on outbreak of war with Japan in December 1941
- Other Allied Forces in Burma
- Forces employed by Japan in Burma.
- Chapter 4 (p. 40)
- Appreciations of a possible Japanese attack on Burma
- View of Singapore Defence Conference
- View of Burma Army
- Dispositions made in accordance with these views
- Reconsideration of situation after outbreak of war with Japan
- Changes of Command affecting Burma
- The Reinforcement problem.
- Chapter 5 (p. 50)
- Opening of the Campaign in December 1941
- Early Operations
- F.F.2 raid on Prachuab Girikhan
- Japanese occupation of Victoria Point and Bokpyin
- F.F.2 attack on Bokpyin
- Other Operations in Tenasserim, Karenni, and in the Shan States
- Internal conditions in Burma
- Air raids on Rangoon and their serious results
- Civil Defence in Burma.
- Chapter 6 (p. 57)
- Detailed appreciation of the military situation by Lieut.-General Mutton
- Events in Tenasserim in January 1942
- Signs of an early Japanese advance
- Evacuation of Mergui
- Japanese attack and capture Tavoy
- Advance of Japanese 55th Division on Kawkareik
- Operations in that area
- Withdrawal of 16 Brigade.
- Chapter 7 (p. 70)
- The Japanese advance on Moulmein
- Operations leading up to the attack on that town on January 30th 1942
- The defence of Moulmein
- British withdrawal on January 31st, 1942.
- Chapter 8 (p. 79)
- Operations on the west bank of the Salween river
- Defence of and withdrawal from Martaban
- Attack on the 7 th Battalion 10th Baluch Regiment at Kuzeik
- Decision to withdraw to the Bilin river
- Evacuation of Thaton on February 15th, 1942.
- Chapter 9 (p. 93)
- British dispositions on the Bilin river line
- Operations on that line
- Heavy enemy attacks held
- Japanese infiltrate round both flanks and carry out coastal landings
- Withdrawal of 17 Division to Kyaikto.
- Chapter 10 (p. 104)
- Operations carried out by 17 Division on February 21st, 22nd and 23rd, 1942
- The withdrawal from Kyaikto
- Japanese attacks on the Sittang bridgehead and on our force east of the river
- Battle of the Sittang
- Withdrawal of 17 Division across the Sittang.
- Chapter 11 (p. 123)
- Operations in the Pegu area between February 26th and March 8th, 1942
- The Japanese attack on Pegu
- Establishment of a road block south of Pegu
- British withdrawal from Pegu and successful attack on the road block.
- Chapter 12 (p. 136)
- Situation in Rangoon during January and February 1942
- Labour shortage
- Evacuation of non-essential population
- Outbreak of lawlessness and looting
- Decision of General Alexander to abandon the port
- Demolitions
- Final withdrawal from Rangoon
- The enemy establish a road block on the road to Prome
- Operations in the Taukkyan area on March 7th and 8th, 1942.
- Chapter 13 (p. 149)
- Effects of the loss of Rangoon
- Regrouping of British forces in the Irrawaddy valley
- Formation of Burcorps
- Minor operations at Henzada and Letpadan
- Japanese attacks on A.V.G. and R.A.F. at Magwe and the serious results thereof
- Formation of a striking force by Burcorps
- Operations of striking force at Padigon and Paungde
- Enemy establish a road block at Shwedaung
- Action at Shwedaung
- Attack on our force at Padaung.
- Chapter 14 (p. 165)
- Operations in the Shan States and Karenni in January and February 1942
- Relief of 1 Burma Division by Chinese VI Army
- Concentration of 1 Burma Division south of Toungoo
- Decision by Army Commander to release unreliable elements in Battalions of Burma Rifles
- Our attacks on Pyuntaza and Shwegyin
- Decision to withdraw 1 Burma Division to the Irrawaddy front
- Actions at Kyauktaga and Gonde.
- Chapter 15 (p. 175)
- Entry into Burma of the Chinese Expeditionary Force
- Organisation and equipment
- Problems of Transport and Supply
- Formation of Chinese Liaison Mission
- Chinese system of Command
- Operations until the end of March 1942
- The loss of Toungoo.
- Chapter 16 (p. 185)
- The situation at Prome
- Decision to evacuate the town
- Dispositions of 17 Division in the area
- Japanese attack on Prome on April 1st, 1942
- Our Withdrawal
- Actions at Ainggyaunngon and Hmawza
- March to Dayindabo
- Plan for the defence of the oilfields
- Withdrawal of Burcorps to line Minhla-Taungdwingyi.
- Chapter 17 (p. 195)
- Defence of the Minhla-Taungdwingyi line
- Failure of Chinese to assist
- Operations about Kokkogwa and Alebo
- Enemy take Migaungye
- Result of this and withdrawal of 1 Burma Division to Yin Chaung line
- Action near Mingyun
- Japanese attack Yin Chaung line
- Withdrawal to Pin Chaung begun
- Operations on west bank of Irrawaddy
- Decision to retain Taungdwingyi.
- Chapter 18 (p. 211)
- Denial Scheme for Yenangyaung and Chauk oilfields
- Orders issued for the destruction of the oilfields
- Japanese establish themselves on the Pin Chaung
- Operations at Yenangyaung between April 16th, and 21st, 1942
- Withdrawal of 1 Burma Division
- Operations by columns of 17 Division from Natmauk and Taungdwingyi
- Plans for an offensive against the Japanese in the Yenangyaung area.
- Chapter 19 (p. 227)
- Effect of the Japanese advance through the Shan States
- General Alexander's plans in the event of the loss of Mandalay
- Decision to fall back to Kalewa to protect India
- Supply problems
- Withdrawal to west bank of Irrawaddy begun
- 2 Burma Brigade ordered to cover Myittha valley
- Successful delaying actions at Meiktila and Kyaukse
- Decision to withdraw Chinese V Army to Katha
- Destruction of the Ava bridge.
- Chapter 20 (p. 244)
- Japanese appear unexpectedly at Monywa
- Attack on Headquarters of 1 Burma Division
- Attack on and capture of Monywa
- Serious results
- Our attempts to recapture the town
- Decision to break off the action and withdrawal of 1 Burma Division on Ye-U
- Minor operations north of Monywa
- Japanese move up the Chindwin -16 Brigade hurried to Kalewa
- March of 2 Burma Brigade by Pauk and Tilin to Kalemyo.
- Chapter 21 (p. 255)
- General Alexander ordered to withdraw his force north of Tamu
- The withdrawal to Shwegyin
- Action at Shwegyin
- Final stages of the withdrawal north of Tamu
- 4 Corps assumes operational control of all Burma Army troops.
- Chapter 22 (p. 266)
- Operations carried out by Chinese Expeditionary Force in April and May 1942
- The Japanese thrust through Karenni and the Shan States
- Collapse of the VI Army
- Occupation by the enemy of Bhamo and Myitkyina
- Chinese operations south of Mandalay
- Withdrawal of V Army and 38th Division to China
- Conduct of Chinese forces during withdrawal
- Failure of British and Chinese to co-operate fully.
- Chapter 23 (p. 277)
- Events in Arakan and more particularly in Akyab
- Civil unrest
- Air attacks on Akyab
- Japanese advance
- Encounters with Japanese
- Evacuation of Akyab
- Organisation of Karen Levies
- Resistance by Karen Levies and Karens of Burma Rifles
- Commando units
- Evacuation of Myitkyina
- Indiscipline of members of armed forces on the northern evacuation routes to India.
- Chapter 24 (p. 286)
- The Air Garrison of Burma
- Its inadequacy
- Strength of Japanese air force opposed to it
- Air attacks on Rangoon
- Our successes
- Air support for early operations of 17 Division
- Withdrawal from Rangoon
- Formation of Burwing and Akwing
- Heavy reverses at Magwe and Akyab
- Termination of R.A.F. activities based on Burma
- Operations from homing and India
- Our air losses and those of the Japanese.
- Chapter 25 (p. 303)
- Civil administration in so far as it affected the military situation
- General failure to place civil and military administration on a war time basis before opening of hostilities
- Evacuation problems
- Work on the Burma-Assam road
- Military administration and other matters
- The Base
- Transport and Supply
- Ordnance
- Transportation and Movement Control
- Denial of Railways and River services
- No general Denial Scheme
- Signals
- Medical stores
- Matters affecting discipline and morale
- Morale of Burma units
- Casualties.
- Chapter 26 (p. 326)
- Careful Japanese preparations for invasion
- Unscrupulous methods
- Wearing of native dress
- Burmese assistance to the enemy
- General attitude of the Burmese
- Japanese treatment of prisoners
- Japanese tactical methods
- Causes of our failure to hold Burma
- Conclusion.
- Appendices
- Appendix A Army in Burma Location Statement for December 1st, 1941. (p. 338)
- Appendix B Army in Burma outline Order of Battle for December 8th, 1941. (p. 349)
- Appendix C State of 17 Division Infantry Battalions on evening of February 24th, 1942. (p. 352)
- Appendix D Chinese Expeditionary Force Order of Battle. (p. 354)
- Appendix E Army in Burma-Order of Battle for April 1st, 1942. (p. 357)